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Monetary policy is now conducted by targeting a very short-term interest 
rate. The Fed and other central banks attempt to control the price level by 
manipulating aggregate demand by adjusting their interest rate target. At 
best, money’s role is tertiary. Indeed, a few prominent and influential 
macroeconomists have suggested that money is not essential, or perhaps is 
irrelevant, for the determination of the price level. Against this backdrop, 
this paper argues that the essential feature of money is that it guarantees 
“final payment” and is essential for price determination. It also suggests 
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In central banking today, “monetary policy” should be more aptly named “short-term 
interest rate policy.” Despite their name, monetary policymakers pay virtually no 
attention to money in the United States or elsewhere. Central banks around the world 
implement monetary policy by targeting a very short-term interest rate such as the 
federal funds rate or similar interbank rate. Prominent monetary economists such as 
Woodford (2000, 2007), Friedman (1999) and King (1999) have suggested the 
possibility of a moneyless economy: Friedman and King argue that this would 
severely limit the effectiveness of monetary policy, while Woodford argues that it 
would not. This paper discusses what money does, why money is critical for 
economic growth and prosperity, and why money is essential for price 
determination—in short, why money matters for monetary policy. I also discuss 
reasons why central bankers’ control over interest rates is more limited than is 
commonly thought. Indeed, recent evidence (Thornton, 2007) suggests that the Fed 
has had little effect on long-term rates despite its apparent increased control over the 
effective federal funds rate. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses money’s role in 
trade and exchange and, most importantly, why money is essential from the 
determination of the price level. Section 3 discusses some reasons for the failure of 
orthodox economic theory to provide an essential, economic-welfare-enhancing role 
for money. Section 4 discusses reasons why central banks’ ability to influence interest 
rates is more limited than commonly thought and presents some recent evidence that 
  1the Fed has had little effect on long-term rates despite its increased control over the 
federal funds rate. Section 5 concludes. 
2.0 Why Money Matters 
Money matters for the simple reason that it has been and remains the most 
efficient means of exchange. Growth in economic welfare is enormously dependent 
(directly or indirectly) on trade (domestic and international). Money is essential for 
trade because, of the three possible means of exchange—barter, credit, and money—
money is far and away the most efficient. To understand the fundamental importance 
of money, consider an autarkic economy were everyone is self sufficient—there is no 
trade. Individuals get utility from consumption and leisure. Leisure is merely the 
amount of time not spent in the production of consumption goods. Individuals 
produce their own consumption good using their share  , 0 1, 1,2,..., ii iN δ δ < <= , 
(where   is the size of the population) of an aggregate economy-wide resource,  N R . 
The economic welfare of such a society is presented in Figure 1, where U  is an index 
of the maximum ordinal utilities of each individual at each possible level of the 
resource.   denotes society’s economic welfare when the amount of society’s 
resource is 
* U
* R . 
The effect of trade using barter as the means of exchange is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Economic welfare increases from   to 
* U
* U ′ as society goes from autarky to 
an exchange economy. The upward shift in the utility contour is due to Ricardo’s 
principle of comparative advantage. However, because exchange is costly, society’s 
gain is less than the vertical shift from U  to U′ at 
* R . This is due to the fact that part 
of society’s resource is used in trade. 
Because trade is costly, individually, and in the aggregate, society could be 
better off if there were a more efficient method of exchange. There are only three 
  2possible methods of exchange—barter, credit, and money. Barter is well understood 
and requires no explanation. Credit is where one individual obtains a commodity from 
another by promising to pay the individual the same or a different commodity at a 
future date. In essence, credit is inter-temporal barter. Money is where one 
commodity is chosen as a general medium of exchange and all goods (including credit 
contracts) are exchanged for money. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of moving from barter as the medium of exchange to 
money. The upward shift in the utility contour is due to the fact that because money 
reduces the cost of exchange, more trade takes place. While there may be other 
reasons why the use of a more efficient means of exchange increases the volume of 
trade, elsewhere (Thornton, 2000) I show that reducing transactions cost increases the 
range of relative prices over which transactions can occur. This increases the 
likelihood that an exchange will take place. Increased trade leads to increased 
specialization and more trade. By reducing exchange costs, money also frees up 
resources, previously used in trade, for production (or leisure). The net effect of the 
social invention of money is a marked increase in economic welfare.
1 Because the 
stock of money is costly to produce and maintain, there is some welfare loss relative 
to a make-believe economies with costless exchange.
2 
It is very important to note that being a medium of exchange is not the most 
important function of money. Being a medium of exchange is really a consequence of 
money’s most important function—guaranteeing final payment. Barter has the 
desirable property that final payment occurs when the exchange takes place—the 
good that you don’t want is exchanged for the one that you want. In a money 
transaction, a good that you don’t want is traded for another good that you don’t 
                                                           
1 Thornton (2000) shows why money cannot be a private good.   
  3intend to consume—money. The difference is that individuals are confident that they 
will be able to trade money for a good that they want. Money is held because 
exchange (converting a good that you don’t want into one that you do want) is done 
most efficiently if you hold money. This is why individuals trade goods for money: 
this is why money is a medium of exchange. 
Of the three mediums of exchange, credit is the least efficient. Credit—the 
exchange of a good for the promise to receive a larger quantity of the same or another 
good at a future date—is rarely used in exchange. Indeed, in a monetary economy, it 
would be rare to find any willingness exchange a good for a promise of a good (other 
than money). That is why credit per se is the least efficient medium of exchange. The 
existence money makes credit an effective means of exchange. Like many people, I 
carry out a large proportion of my transactions with a credit card rather than checks or 
cash. I am able to do this because I promise to settle my account with the credit card 
company with cash or by transferring money from my deposit in a financial 
institution. I doubt the credit card company would be so willing to “finance” my 
economic transactions if I promised final settlement in sacks of potatoes or economic 
consulting services. It is the existence of money that makes the widespread use of 
credit transactions feasible. Were it not for the existence of money, credit would 
seldom be used as a medium of exchange.
3 It is hardly surprising that credit 
economies don’t exist. 
An important feature of money is that it is so much more efficient than barter 
or credit as a means of exchange that it continues to function as the primary means of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Elsewhere, I (Thornton, 2000) speculate that such costs motivated the evolution to fiat money 
systems. 
3 See Thornton (2000) for limitations on the usefulness of credit as a medium of exchange. 
  4exchange even when the cost of holding it is very high, as during hyperinflations.
4 
This observation has important implications for the portfolio-balance theory of 
money. The portfolio-balance theory of money assumes that individuals efficiently 
allocate their assets between bonds and money. In this model, changes in the rates of 
return on bonds cause individuals to reallocate their portfolios from money to bonds, 
suggesting that the demand for money is relatively interest sensitive. Economic agents 
are price takers. Given the prices of goods, individuals hold the quantity of nominal 
(and hence real) money balances that are necessary to execute their planned 
transactions over their planning period. They may or may not hold some additional 
money balances as a safeguard for unexpected transactions (i.e., precautionary money 
demand). Given prices and their expenditure plans, the ability of individuals to 
reallocate their portfolio between money and bonds in response to a change in interest 
rates is limited. The problem is that there are no good substitutes for money as a 
medium of exchange. Of course, individuals can economize on their holdings of 
money by making more frequent allocations between non-interest-bearing money and 
interest-bearing bond, a la Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). For most people the 
incentive to behave in such a way is very small, however. For example, assume that 
an individaul has an average monthly money balance of $10,000 and the interest rate 
is 5 percent. A procedure that instantaneously moves funds from interest-bearing 
assets to non-interest-bearing money at precisely the instant when each transaction 
occurs would generate an additional $500 annually—$1.37 per day. The typical 
individual holds considerably less than $10,000 in money balances. Moreover, while 
economic theorists populate economies with continuously optimizing economic 
agents, real world economies are not. It seems more likely that individuals alter their 
                                                           
4 See Thornton (2000) for a more complete discussion of reasons for the dominance of money as a 
means of exchange. 
  5money holdings only when it becomes clear that the current allocation no longer 
meets their needs due to changes in income or expenditure patterns or when the rates 
of return on bonds increase very substantially. Hence, even relatively large changes in 
the rate of return on bonds should generate relatively modest changes, and for many 
individuals, no change in their holding of money. 
Finally, it is extremely important to note that the price level is the price of 
commodities in terms of money. This simple fact means that money is essential for 
the determination of the price level as we know it. In a fiat money world, the dollar is 
nothing more than a name given to a unit that the government guarantees can be used 
for final settlement—for the payment of all debts public and private. The long-term 
existence of fiat money depends on the government’s guarantee of final payment. 
Absent this guarantee, transactions may take place an abstract unit of account called 
the “dollar,” with private institutions providing the guarantee of final payment. There 
is no way to keep these institutions from buying goods by simply entering “dollar” 
claims against themselves, nor is there anyway to keep them from reneging on their 
“guarantee.” The essential function of money is to guarantee final payment, and only 
the government can credibly make such a guarantee in a fiat money world.
5 
Typically, governments guarantee final payment by issuing currency which is 
legal tender. Deposits of all types can be redeemed at a fixed one-to-one exchange 
rate with currency, making currency and deposits perfect substitutes. The central bank 
controls the price level by controlling the supply of base money—currency and 
central bank deposits. Historically, base money has consisted of currency plus 
deposits with the central bank. The central-bank-deposit component of the U.S. 
monetary base is shrinking because most banks sweep transactions deposits (e.g., 
                                                           
5 See Rolnick and Weber (1983, 1984) and Rockoff (1974) for a discussion of the failure of free 
banking because of the inability to guarantee final payment. 
  6Anderson and Rasche, 2001) in order to avoid the “reserve tax.” Given the 
advancements in technology, I am not sure whether currency will always exist; 
however, I agree with Charles Goodhart (2000) that it is unlikely that currency will go 
out of existence anytime soon. But if it were to go out of existence, the government 
would simply guarantee final payment in some other way. As long as the government 
guarantees final payment of whatever is the unit of account, money will exist. As long 
as the monetary authority controls the aggregate nominal quantity of the base money 
that supports this guarantee, it can control the price level. While the exchange 
technology will continue to evolve, there will never be a world without money.
6   
3.0 The Role of Money in Economic Theory 
I believe that many if not most economists support the broad theory of the role 
of money outlined above. The problem is the failure of economic theory to devise a 
model that incorporates the salient features of money’s fundamental role as a 
guarantor of final payment. This failure is due in part from starting in the wrong 
place. Rather than introducing money into a model of exchange where the sole means 
of exchange is barter and where money evolves to reduce the transactions costs, 
money is often appended to models where it has no essential function. Particularly 
troubling are models based on a Walrasian auctioneer. The auctioneer calls out prices 
in terms of numeraire until markets clear.
7 Goods are then exchanged. There is no 
need to guarantee final payment. Such economies don’t need money. Incorporating 
                                                           
6 It is worth noting that money is never the sole medium of exchange in a monetary economy. Barter is 
also used; however, its use is limited. Barter is primarily used in the case of second-hand sales of non-
homogenous goods, to avoid taxes, and for illegal transactions. 
7 See Thornton (2000, pp. 47-48) for an argument for why the coexistence of the medium of exchange 
and unit of account functions and why it is inefficient to guarantee payment in anything other than the 
unit of account. 
  7money into such a model is fruitless. The Walrasian auctioneer completely eliminates 
the transactions costs that motivate the social contrivance called money.
8 
There is also no role for money to play in other macroeconomic models that 
profess to have microeconomic foundations. A number of researchers (e.g., Hoover, 
2006, and Forni and Lippi, 1997) have observed that the representative framework—
which is the sine qua non of these models—is actually devoid of agent-by-agent 
modeling and aggregation essential for true microeconomic analyses. This flaw is 
fatal in the case of money. Money’s sole purpose is to facilitate exchange between 
economic agents. Without agent-by-agent modeling, it is difficult to motivate the 
existence of money. 
Mainstream economic theory has attempted to provide a role for money by 
requiring a “cash-in-advance constraint,” or by arbitrarily included money in either 
household’s utility functions or in producer’s production functions. Because money 
plays no real role in these models, economic wellbeing is increased (or at least not 
reduced) by removing money. 
Money plays no essential role in the canonical new Keyesian macroeconomic 
model. The model consists of an IS curve, some form of an expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule, typically a Taylor-type rule. Some 
prominent macroeconomists, e.g., McCallum (2001), argue that money’s role in this 
model is important but implicit. Like the great and powerful Wizard of Oz, money is 
hidden. Specifically, McCallum (2001) argues that money is critical because “the 
central bank’s control over the one-period nominal interest rate ultimately stems from 
its ability to control the quantity of base money in existence.”
9 I have more to say 
about central banks’ ability to control interest rates in Section 3. For now I simply 
                                                           
8 I believe Walras did monetary theorists no favor by constructing this synthetic marketplace. 
9 McCallum (2001, p. 146). 
  8note that inflation is determined by the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. That 
is, current inflation is completely determined by inflation expectations and the gap 
between actual and potential output. Money has no special—let alone unique—role in 
the inflation process. Monetary policy is simply one of many factors that affect 
aggregate demand and, thereby, inflation. Inflation can be controlled as easily with 
fiscal policy as it can with money. Money is not essential.
10 Because the New 
Keyesian model does not preclude controlling inflation by controlling the money 
stock, it is widely endorsed both by economists who believe that money is essential 
for long-run inflation control and those who believe money to be irrelevant. 
The output gap is the difference between the actual level of output and the 
natural level of output—which Woodford (2003) defines as “the level of output that 
would occur in equilibrium with flexible wages and prices, given current real factors 
(tastes, technology, government purchases).”
11 The only difference between inflation 
theory circa 1960-70 and today is that in the former period inflation was thought to be 
the “cost-push” variety.
12 Aggregate demand was thought to be relatively 
inconsequential.
13 Today, aggregate demand has taken center stage. Nevertheless, 
policymakers remained concerned about the “inflationary impact” of cost-push 
factors—higher wages, oil price shocks, etc. 
It is useful to consider the Keynesian view of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy circa 1970 with the New Keynesian model of today. Just as today, changes in 
the money supply were thought to generate changes in interest rates. Nevertheless, 
monetary policy was thought to have a minor effect on aggregate demand. Changes in 
interest rates would simply induce individuals to change their holding of money 
                                                           
10 See Nelson’s (2008) comment on Woodford (2007) for a discussion of why money is essential to this 
model in the long-run. 
11 Woodford (2003, p. 8). 
12 See Laidler (2004) and Bronferbrenner and Holtzman (1963). 
  9balances. The endogenous response of velocity would largely or completely offset the 
effect of the change in interest rates on aggregate demand. 
Moreover, the direct effect of the change in interest rates on aggregate demand 
was thought to be relatively inconsequential: Evidence indicated that consumption 
and investment were relatively insensitive to changes in interest rates, e.g., Bernanke 
(1993). I am unaware of evidence that the interest elasticity of spending is much 
higher than previously thought. In spite of this, monetary policy is now thought to be 
highly effective in controlling aggregate demand to stabilize output and control 
inflation by changing very short-term interest rates.
14 Nowadays, monetary policy 
controls inflation by adjusting the real interest rate relative to the natural rate of 
interest, “the real rate of interest required to keep aggregate demand at all times equal 
to the natural rate of output.”
15 
How did the economics profession shift from believing that central banks had 
limited ability to affect inflation to believing that central banks can control inflation, 
while at the same time believing that money plays, at best, a tertiary role in inflation 
control? I believe there are two reasons. First, because of some institutional changes, 
most notably the Monetary Control Act of 1980, the empirical relationship between 
M1 (and other monetary aggregates) and nominal GDP broke down. Without a clear 
statistical relationship between the growth rate of some measure of money and 
inflation, even monetarists reduced their dependence on monetary aggregates for the 
conduct of monetary policy.  
The second reason is the lack of a monetary policy transmission mechanism 
that directly links money to inflation. At an abstract level, I believe virtually every 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 See Nelson (2005), Romer and Romer (2002), Laidler (2004), and Thornton (2007). 
14 For more recent evidence on the interest sensitivity of consumption and short-term rates, see Cromb 
and Fernandez-Corugedo (2004).  
15 Woodford (2003, p. 248). 
  10economist acknowledges the crucial role of money in facilitating exchange and 
enhancing economic welfare described in Section 2. The problem is the lack of a 
credible model of the transmission of money to inflation. This problem is exacerbated 
by monetary neutrality. Given the equilibrium stock of real money, changes in the 
nominal money stock result in a higher price level without affecting the equilibrium 
level of economic activity or economic welfare. The classical dichotomy—relative 
prices and output being determined by real factors and the price level determined by 
the demand for real money relative to the supply of nominal money—has not been 
modeled fully. Indeed, developing a transactions model where changes in the nominal 
stock of money have short-run effects on real variables (due to frictions), but 
ultimately affect only the price level is no simple task. In the absence of a rigorous 
theory of the monetary transmission mechanism, economists have resorted to an 
“output gap” theory of inflation. I believe that the fact that the New Keyesian model 
does not require money for inflation control has led prominent macro-theorists such as 
Woodford (2000, 2007) to conclude that money is both unimportant and un-
necessary. In the short-run, inflation is determined by inflation expectations and the 
output gap. Since the long-run is nothing more than the integral of the short runs, 
money is also unnecessary in the long-run. 
It is now recognized that inflation expectations play a critical role in the 
inflation process. This gives central banks considerable control over inflation because 
central banks play a crucial role in anchoring inflation expectations. However, it also 
reinforces the belief by some that money is not crucial for inflation control. 
Policymakers merely anchor inflation expectations. But, as I have already noted, 
controlling inflation and, hence, anchoring inflation expectations does not require 
controlling the nominal supply of base money in either the short or the long runs. 
  114.0 Monetary Policy and the Interest Rate 
In this section I discuss reasons to believe that the Fed’s ability to control 
interest rates may be more limited than is commonly thought. Historically there has 
been a very close relationship between the Fed’s target for the funds rates and the 
funds rate. Indeed, until very recently, the relationship has been extremely tight—just 
a few basis points different on average over the month or quarter. This fact 
notwithstanding, I believe that there are some important reasons to be skeptical of the 
Fed’s, or any other central bank’s, ability to control interest rates more generally. 
I begin my discussion by noting that what matters for economic activity is the 
level of the structure of interest rates not the level of the overnight policy rate. As 
Woodford (2001) puts it, “changes in central-bank targets for overnight rates in 
affecting spending decisions (and, hence, ultimately pricing and employment 
decisions) is wholly dependent upon the impact of such actions upon other financial-
market prices, such as longer-term interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates.”
16 
As Former Chairman Greenspan put it,  
The problem that we have here is that monetary policy works 
through its effects on overall financial markets. The presumption 
that a 25 basis point, a 50 basis point, or even a 75 basis point 
change in an overnight rate can come to grips with the supply-
demand imbalance is in my view silliness in the extreme. The 
overnight rate is just not tied into this process in any direct way. 
What we actually do is to foster a term structure of interest rates by 
our policy actions and thereby influence real long-term rates.
17 
 
From a broad perspective, the structure of interest rates is complicated. 
Interest rates differ by the maturity of the contract, the issuer of the note, special 
features of the contract such as the existence and quality of collateral, whether the 
note is callable, etc. The term structure of interest rates collapses a complicated multi-
                                                           
16 Woodford (2001, pp. 307-308) emphasis added.  Also, see Woodford (2005) for a discussion of the 
relationship between the funds rate target and long-term rates. 
17 Transcript of the FOMC meeting, February 1-2, 2000, p. 124. 
  12dimensional structure to two dimensions—the interest rate and maturity—by holding 
all other things constant. Empirically this is achieved by considering only default-risk-
free, zero-coupon government securities. In practice, however, economists and 
policymakers sometimes have term structure discussions about assets that do not meet 
the stringent requirement of the theory. 
Economists can debate the extent to which spending decisions are affected by 
the behavior of short-term or long-term rates. But whether explicitly stated or not, to 
be totally effective, monetary policy must affect interest rates across the entire 
structure of rates. That is, it must affect the interest rate, where the interest rate can be 
thought of as an index of interest rates analogous to the price level. 
There are two ways that policy can affect the interest rate—directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect stems from the realization that the demand for money 
depends on the interest rate.
18 The interest sensitivity of money demand gives rise to 
the possibility that an exogenous change in the supply of nominal money balances 
(and, hence, real at existing prices) can affect the interest rate. There are several 
reasons to be skeptical of the direct effect of a change in the money supply on interest 
rates.  
First, the price level, not the interest rate, is the price of money. The interest 
rate is the price of credit. In equilibrium, the interest rate, the price level, the quantity 
of real money balances, and the quantity of real credit are determined simultaneously. 
Ultimately, the effect of a change in the supply of money on the interest rate is limited 
to the effect of a change in the supply of money on the supply of credit. It is well 
known that an exogenous change in the supply of money has a relatively small effect 
on the net supply of credit—being essentially equal to the change in the supply of 
  13base money.
19 The small size of changes in the monetary base—roughly, the Fed’s 
contribution to changes in the total supply of credit—makes it difficult to understand 
exactly how the Fed can have such a large effect on the interest rate. Friedman (1999) 
notes this problem by asking how the Fed’s actions of buying or selling $1 or $5 
billion of securities over an entire year can have a major impact on a $14 trillion 
market. He notes that the disparity between the size of central bank actions and the 
markets they operate is characteristic of other economies too. The puzzle is 
exacerbated by the fact that perhaps more than any other market, financial markets are 
global. To have a significant effect on the interest rate, Fed actions must significantly 
alter the supply of credit worldwide. Friedman (1999) argues that historically, the 
Fed’s ability to affect the interest rate is due to its monopoly control over reserves, 
which he believes is eroding for a variety of reasons. 
It is important to note, however, that monopoly power is not enough. Reserve 
requirements mean only that Fed open market operations impact the amount of credit 
supplied by institutions that have reserve requirements relative to those that do not. 
The impact of open market operations on the total supply of credit is limited to the 
change in base money regardless of whether or not the Fed imposes reserve 
requirements. 
Second, the conclusion that changes in the money supply affect interest rates 
is predicated on the belief that prices and output do not respond initially to a change in 
the money supply. Sticky prices—the hallmark of modern macroeconomic theory—is 
the principal reason economists believe that changes in the money supply affect 
interest rates (e.g., Abel and Bernanke, 1992). If changes in the money supply don’t 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 There was once a debate about whether the demand for money depended on a long-term or shot-term 
interest rate.  For this analysis, it is assumed that the demand for money depends on the interest rate, 
without concern for whether long-term or short-term rates might matter more. 
  14affect output or prices, they affect the interest rate. There is evidence that individual 
prices are not that sticky. Moreover, it could be that, initially, individuals passively 
adjusting their money holdings and only, subsequently, their spending, so that, 
initially, a change in the supply of money has no affect output, prices, or the interest 
rate. 
Third, for reasons noted earlier, the demand for money should be relatively 
interest inelastic. Consequently, relatively small exogenous changes in the supply of 
money should be accompanied by relatively large changes in interest rates. Indeed, if 
the impact of an exogenous change in the nominal money supply on interest rates is as 
strong as policymakers and economists seem to believe, it should be relatively easy to 
observe in the data. Just the opposite is true. Empirical work using monthly and 
quarterly data provided no evidence of a liquidity effect.
20  
Furthermore, the evidence (Hamilton, 1997; Thornton, 2001ab, 2004, 2007ab; 
and Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006) suggests that Fed actions have a modest impact on 
interest rates at the daily frequency. Hence, the liquidity effect has been extremely 
difficult to isolate at any frequency. The inability to find convincing evidence of the 
effect of a change in money or reserves on the interest rate should cause economists 
and policymakers to question the degree to which policy actions affect interest rates. 
Those skeptical of the central bank’s ability to control the interest rate directly 
rely indirect control, which stems form the central bank’s ability to control a very 
short-term interest rate—in the case of the Fed, the overnight federal funds rate. 
Federal funds are deposits of depository institutions in Federal Reserve Banks that are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 For additional discussions along this line, see Thornton (1995), Friedman (1999), and McCloskey 
(2000). 
20 The sole exception is nonborrowed reserves, see Pagan and Robertson (1995). However, Thornton 
(2001b) showed that the “liquidity effect” obtained using nonborrowed reserves is solely a 
consequence of the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York offsetting the nonborrowed 
  15bought or sold among depository institutions. Changes or expected changes in the 
funds rate are thought to be translated throughout the structure of rates. 
Historically, the Fed was thought to control the funds rate through the standard 
liquidity effect. But, as I have just noted, evidence of the liquidity effect is weak. 
Moreover, to control interest rates in this way, the Fed’s actions must have a large 
effect on the total supply of credit. To see why, note that the initial effect of an open 
market sale or purchase is on banks’ deposit balances with the Fed. By implication, 
open market operations should impact the funds rate. There are some technical issues 
worth considering, however. First, banks must maintain reserves on a daily average 
basis over a two-week maintenance period. This means that deposits held with 
Federal Reserve Banks during any day during the maintenance period are equally 
useful for satisfying the bank’s reserve requirement. In principle, reserves held on any 
two days of the maintenance period are perfect substitutes for meeting the bank’s 
reserve requirement. While Hamilton (1996) strongly rejects the martingale 
hypothesis implied by perfect substitutability, substitution of reserves between days of 
the maintenance period limits the Fed’s ability to control the funds rate on a daily 
basis. 
Reserve requirements are binding on the last day of the maintenance period, 
called settlement Wednesday. Hence, there is no limitation on the Fed’s ability to 
control the funds rate at lower frequencies, such as a maintenance period. If the Fed 
fails to supply the aggregate amount of reserves that banks demand because of their 
lending and investment actives, the funds rate will rise on settlement Wednesday. 
Likewise, if the Fed happens to supply too many reserves in aggregate, the funds rate 
will fall. Hence, the Fed could raise the funds rate on a maintenance-period-average 
                                                                                                                                                                      
reserves. effect on total reserves of interest-induced changes in borrowing—i.e., the estimated 
“liquidity effect” is not a genuine liquidity effect. 
  16basis by providing fewer reserves than banks demand. Banks would restore the 
equilibrium in the reserve market by curtailing loans and investments and, hence, the 
supply of bank credit. 
To understand potential problems with this mechanism consider first the case 
where the Fed is targeting the funds rate but the market is unaware that the Fed is 
doing so that market participants have no policy-related expectations for the policy 
rate. In this case, how much other rates moved depends on the Fed’s ability to affect 
the supply of credit generally. To illustrate the point, assume that effect on the total 
supply of credit is essentially nil so that other rates were essentially unaffected by the 
Fed’s action. Over the next maintenance period the funds rate would return to 
whatever level was consistent with other rates. If the Fed wants to keep the funds rate 
up, it must once again supply fewer reserves than banks require. This process must 
continue until the Fed reduces the supply of credit sufficiently to affect other rates. 
That is, the Fed’s ability to affect the key interest rate is once again limited by its 
ability to affect the total supply of credit. In effect, the Fed would have to make the 
supply of reserves perfectly elastic at the target rate. The Fed nor any central bank has 
done this. The ECB has a 100-basis-point band on either side of the target rate, which 
gives them ample time to respond to changes in the equilibrium rate. 
It is now widely accepted that the Fed moves the funds rate through “open 
mouth operations” rather than open market operations (e.g., Friedman, 1999, 2000; 
and Taylor, 2001). The funds rate apparently remains close to the funds rate target 
because market participants believe that the Fed could keep it there if they wanted to. 
As Friedman (1999) notes, “a widely shared opinion today is that central banks need 
  17not actually do anything. With a clear enough statement of intentions, ‘the markets 
will do all of the work for them’.”
21 
In this case, other interest rates could be affected by changes (or expected 
changes) in the target rate via the expectations hypothesis (EH) of the term structure 
of interest rates. The EH is the proposition that a longer-term rate is equal to the 
average of the current and expected future short-term rate. If the EH holds, it holds for 
all possible maturities of long- and short-term rates.
22 Hence, all rates would be linked 
to the overnight funds rate. Evidence against the EH is overwhelming (e.g., Campbell 
and Shiller, 1991; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall, 
1997; Sarno, Valente, and Thornton, 2007; and Thornton, 2005). Hence, the ability of 
the Fed to control the interest rate through the EH mechanism is questionable. 
4.1 Interest Rate Control across the Term Structure 
It is arguably the case that the Fed has been conducting monetary policy using 
a short-term interest rate instrument throughout most of its history. It is commonly 
known that the Fed targeted the federal funds rate explicitly during the middle 1970s, 
but abandoned the procedure in October 1979 in favor of monetary aggregate 
targeting. Elsewhere (Thornton, 2006), I show that the Fed resumed funds rate 
targeting in 1982 but, preferring to be seen as targeting borrowed reserves, was 
unwilling to acknowledge this fact. Indeed, the Fed acknowledged targeting the funds 
rate long after market became well aware it.
23 Today, the Fed announces changes in 
                                                           
21 Friedman (1999, p. 322).  See Woodford (2000) for a similar analysis. 
22 Strictly speaking, the EH applies only to assets that are identical except for their term to maturity.  
Differences in default risk and other factors negates the strong predictive power of the EH. 
23 It is interesting to note that policymakers did not return to interest rate targeting because they wanted 
to, but rather because they thought they had no other choice. Chairman Greenspan made the point 
explicitly at the July 1997 FOMC meeting, stating, “I think we were well aware of what would happen 
when we shifted to an explicit federal funds rate target. As you may recall, we fought off that 
apparently inevitable day as long as we could. We ran into the situation, as you may remember, when 
the money supply, nonborrowed reserves, and various other non-interest-rate measures on which the 
Committee had focused had in turn fallen by the wayside. We were left with interest rates because we 
had no alternative. I think it is still in a sense our official policy that if we can find a way back to where 
  18the funds rate target when they are made and the market attempts to determine the 
next likely target change. 
Funds rate targeting today is much different than in the 1970s and the early 
1980s. During the 1970s and early 1980s the funds rate was used as an operational 
guide for implementing daily open market operations. If the funds rate was trading 
high relative to the target, the desk would tend to add reserves; if it was low or high, 
reserves would be drained or add, respectively (Muelendyke, 1998). Moreover, the 
target was adjusted frequently with changing market conditions. For example, 
Rudebusch (1995) reports that the funds rate target was adjusted 99 times during the 
period from September 1974 to early October 1979, an average of once every two and 
a half weeks. The funds rate target was also adjusted frequently from September 1982 
through December 1989—64 times, an average of once every five weeks. The less-
frequent changes over this period can be attributed to the well-known greater 
tranquility of the economy and interest rates beginning in the early 1980s. 
Target changes have been less frequent since 1989, averaging about a change 
every three months. There have been two periods of a year or longer when there was 
no target change. More important, once the market became aware that the Fed was 
targeting the funds rate and the level of the target, the Fed began adjusting the target 
to achieve its policy objectives rather than simply adjusting the target with changing 
market conditions as it had done previously. That is, the FOMC went from using the 
funds rate as an operational instrument to setting the target to achieve its policy 
objective. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
we are able to target the money supply or net borrowed reserves or some other non-interest measure 
instead of the federal funds rate, we would like to do that. I am not sure we will be able to return to 
such a regime..., but the reason is not that we enthusiastically embrace targeting the federal funds rate. 
We did it as an unfortunate fallback when we had no other options…”, Transcript, July 1997 FOMC 
meeting, pp. 80–81. 
  19The transition from using the federal funds rate as an operational objective to a 
policy target was accompanied by a marked change in the relationship between the 
federal funds rates and Treasury yields. Figure 4 shows the federal funds rate and 3- 
and 6-month Treasury rates (ff, tb3, and tb6) and the 1-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury 
bond yields (T1, T5, T10) from January 1983 through March 2007. All rates tend to 
move together, with shorter-term rate demonstrating very high co-movement. The 
rates trend down over the period. This likely reflects lower inflation, lower and more 
firmly anchored inflation expectations, and perhaps a more stable real economy 
associated with the great moderation. 
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where  , or  . The six equations are estimated over the entire 
sample period with the cross-equation restrictions 
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i
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j δ δ = , for all i and 
j , imposed.
24 Figure 5 presents the detrended federal funds and 10-year Treasury 
yields. The figure shows that the rates moved closely together until May 1988 (the 
date of the vertical line). This date was determined by a break-point test of a simple 
regression of the change in the 10-year yield on the federal funds rate using the 
procedure suggested by Andrews (1993). This date corresponds closely to when the 
market became aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate (e.g., Poole, Rasche, 
and Thornton, 2002) and with evidence that the Greenspan regime began adjusting the 
target to achieve broader policy objectives (Thornton, 2007).
25 
                                                           
1
j 24 The chi-square statistics for the tests of the hypotheses  1
i δ δ =  and  2
i
2
j δ δ =  are 1.78 and 0.25, 
respectively; neither is significant at conventional significance levels. 
25 See Thornton (2007) for additional evidence that the change was due to the FOMC switching from 
using the funds rate as an operational instrument to a policy target. 
  20The switch from using the funds rate as an operating instrument to a policy 
target altered the relationship between the funds rate and other rates along the yield 
curve. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the 24-month rolling correlation of 
the detrended federal funds and other detrended Treasury rates. The correlation 
between the detrended funds rate and other rates is high and stable until around May 
1988, after which the correlation becomes much less stable. Longer-term rates are 
most affected. The correlation of the 10-year Treasury yield declines sharply for a 
level of about 80 percent in the early 1980s and becomes highly variable. There are 
several periods of more than two years (including the period that gave rise to 
Chairman Greenspan’s famous “conundrum” remark) when the correlation is 
negative. The relationships between the funds rate and all other Treasury rates are 
affected to varying degrees. The relationship between the funds rate and other rates 
has weakened since the late 1980s despite a significant tightening of the relationship 
between the funds rate and the funds rate target. These data suggest that the effect of 
monetary policy actions on Treasury rates has been uneven. For short-term rates, the 
relationship is most often strong and positive, but varies over the sample period. The 
relationship is particularly weak during the mid- to late-1990s. The effect of policy 
actions on longer-term rates is very unstable, with extended periods where there is 
essentially no relationship or even a negative relationship. These data provide yet 
another reason to be skeptical about the Fed’s ability to control interest rates across 
the term structure and, thereby, influence aggregate demand by adjusting the target for 
the federal funds rate. 
5.0 Conclusions 
I have argued that the essential function of money is to guarantee final 
payment. Monetary exchange makes it virtually certain that an individual will be able 
  21to exchange a good that they don’t want for one that they do want. Because of 
money’s efficiency over barter (or credit) in providing this function, money’s 
existence significantly enhances economic welfare by greatly increasing trade and 
specialization relative to what would be the case in the absence of money. Because 
the alternative mediums of exchange—barter and credit—cannot provide this 
function, economies will always have money. The price level is the money price of 
goods. Hence, controlling the nominal stock of final payment is essential to price 
control. Suggestions that the Fed can control prices without controlling the nominal 
stock of money (or final payment) are simply wrong. Such assertions appear to be 
motivated by the belief that the expectations-augmented Phillips curve adequately 
represents the economy’s inflation (or price-setting) process. While inflation 
expectations are extremely important for the inflation process, the importance of the 
output gap or NAIRU is questionable (e.g., Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997; Piger 
and Rasche, 2007). In any event, the price level as we know it is inexorably tied to the 
nominal stock of money. 
The negligible role of money in modern monetary policy is due in part to its 
unessential role in monetary theory. Models of monetary policy that purport to have 
micro-foundations are typically built upon a framework where money has no essential 
function to perform and, consequently, no reason to exist. In the canonical New 
Keynesian model, money’s role is implicit. In the short-run, inflation is completely 
determined by inflation expectations and the output gap. Money plays no essential 
role in determining either inflation expectations or the size of the output gap. Both are 
determined by the monetary authority’s setting of the overnight interest rate target. 
Because the long run is nothing more than the integral of all of the short runs, it is 
hardly surprising that some modern theorists have suggested that money plays no role 
  22in price determination in either the short or long runs. It appears unlikely that money 
will be fully integrated into economic theory and, hence, monetary policy until the 
economics profession develops a model that incorporates money’s essential function. 
Modern monetary theory and policy rests on the ability of the central bank to 
control interest rates across the structure of debt instruments. There is little doubt that 
the Fed has controlled the overnight federal funds rate since the market has become 
aware that the Fed is targeting the funds rate. There is virtually no evidence that the 
Fed has controlled the funds rate via the traditional liquidity effect, however. Indeed, 
it is now commonly accepted that the Fed controls the funds rate through open mouth 
rather than open market operations. Regardless of how the Fed controls the federal 
funds rate, the relationship between the funds rate and other rates has changed 
dramatically since the late 1980s. While rates of all maturity assets are affected, the 
effect is larger at the longer end of the term structure, where the relationship can be 
negative for long periods of time. 
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29Figure 4: The Funds Rate and Treasury Rates
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Figure 6: 24-Month Rolling Correlation of the De-Trended Funds Rate with Other De-
Trended Rates
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